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I. INTRODUCTION
Americans began hoarding Cipro—a drug that can be used to
treat anthrax—within a month of the 9/11 attacks. As if to confirm
their fears, an anthrax scare gripped the nation in a matter of weeks.
The threat of a bioterrorist attack had been contemplated before, but
it was brought into sharp relief during the anthrax crisis. In part as a
result of the juxtaposition of 9/11 and the anthrax scare, bioterrorism response plans have become a central aspect of emergency preparedness.
This Comment will examine the practical effects of recent developments in bioterrorism response plans. I will argue that states that
have not engaged in a thoughtful modernization of their bioterrorism response laws have left their citizens vulnerable to unconstitutional infringement of their civil liberties in the event of a bioterrorist
attack, and that modernization is long overdue. The bioterrorism response legislation of three states (Minnesota, Mississippi, and Delaware) illuminates the varying relationship of these plans to citizens’
constitutional rights. I examine Delaware and Minnesota law because
the statutes enacted in those states demonstrate different approaches
to modernizing public health emergency laws; I analyze Mississippi
law because it is one of the states that has not updated its laws that authorize public health emergency response. Delaware has largely enacted the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act (“MSEHPA” or
1
“Model Act”), which is discussed below. Minnesota has been noted
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by one of the chief academic critics of the MSEHPA as an example of
how the MSEHPA can be amended to conform with constitutional
2
requirements for the protection of civil liberties. These three states
provide a sample of the forms that such legislation can take and the
impact that public health emergency legislation can have on constitutional rights. My analysis demonstrates that old public health laws
that resemble those of Mississippi are insufficient to protect individuals from governmental encroachment upon their civil liberties in the
event of a public health emergency. The MSEHPA is not ideal, however, and if states enact comprehensive bioterrorism response legislation, they should use the MSEHPA as a template and add provisions
designed to preserve the constitutional rights of the citizenry in the
event of an attack of bioterrorism.
Part II examines the MSEHPA, its implications, and the legal academic response to the Model Act. Parts III and IV examine the right
to procedural due process and the right to personal autonomy in
three different states in terms of the kind of protection afforded (and
not afforded) by bioterrorism response plans with respect to two public health tools: quarantine and mass vaccination. The analysis of
these rights sheds light on the debate regarding the balance between
civil liberties and terrorism response because they are flashpoints—
rights guaranteed by the Constitution that are likely to be threatened
by a poorly executed response to an act of bioterrorism. The effects
of quarantine on procedural due process rights and the effects of the
use of mass vaccination on the right to personal autonomy are key
because quarantine and vaccination are public health tools that are
either currently in use or have been widely used throughout American history to prevent the spread of infectious disease. In addition,
examining the rights within the context of quarantine and vaccination provides an example of the implications of each of the plans.
States that have not taken steps to modernize their laws regarding
state police power with respect to such matters should recognize that
the constitutional rights of their citizens are in jeopardy. While Delaware could adopt more protective measures that would still allow
for effective responses to bioterrorism, the differences between the
Delaware and Minnesota plans are dwarfed by the differences between the two modern plans and Mississippi’s statutory framework
that provides for bioterrorism response. Mississippi lacks nearly all of
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the protective measures present in the Minnesota or the Delaware
plans. Using the MSEHPA to modernize bioterrorism response law is
a useful starting point, but it can be amended to provide additional
protection for the rights of the citizenry. In the case of public health
measures like quarantine, the likelihood is that no realistic plan is going to be particularly palatable from the perspective of preserving
civil liberties, but if states do implement quarantine, modern statutes
are more likely to hold officials accountable for actions that infringe
upon the civil rights of individuals and to provide protection for citizens’ constitutional rights.
II. THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT
Shortly after 9/11 and the anthrax scare that followed, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) asked a multidisciplinary team at the Center for Law and the Public’s Health at Georgetown University and Johns Hopkins University to draft a model
statute to guide states seeking to update their public health emer3
gency laws. The team that undertook the project was established before 9/11; the Turning Point Public Health Statute Modernization
Collaborative and the Center for Law and the Public’s Health began
working towards a legal transformation of the public health system
after the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and the W.K. Kellogg
4
Foundation funded the establishment of the Collaborative in 2000.
The initial focus of the Collaborative was to assess public health laws
with regard to a range of public health issues, but after the 9/11 attacks the team turned its attention to the pressing issue of bioterror5
ism.
The goal of the MSEHPA was to provide a template for modernizing public health emergency legislation that was tailored to current
6
public health threats. The authors acknowledged in the Model Act’s
accompanying commentary that some limitations on civil liberties
may be necessary in an emergency, but they argued that the team set
out to prevent infringement on civil liberties and to set a high bar for
7
what can be deemed a public health emergency. The resulting
3
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model statute has had a substantial impact on state laws. As of July
9
2006, thirty-eight states had adopted some portion of the MSEHPA.
The Model Act has also set off a firestorm of criticism about the
sweeping powers it gives to state officials in the event of a public
health emergency.
George Annas, a law and public health professor at Boston University, is one of the chief academic opponents of the MSEHPA. Annas has argued that the Model Act is too broad, applying to an exces10
sive range of public health incidents. In addition, Annas disputes
the notion that all acts of bioterrorism should be handled by public
health officials; he points out that much of the emergency response
will be handled by medical professionals employed by hospitals and
other private facilities, and that public health personnel should over11
see the process and provide guidance to the public, and therefore
need not be granted such sweeping powers. Annas also objects to the
Act because it assumes the worst on several fronts. To begin with, he
has argued that many of the eventualities contemplated by the Model
Act, including mass quarantine and forced vaccination, are unnecessary (and likely to be ineffective) in the event of an actual public
12
health emergency. Also, Annas notes that the Model Act assumes
that medical personnel and the public will be unwilling to cooperate
with the relief effort in the event of an attack; he points out that the
13
response to 9/11 should lead us to the opposite conclusion. Finally,
Annas argues that the MSEHPA gives the governors of individual
states and health officials acting under their authority far too much
14
power.
Lawrence Gostin, a prominent public health law scholar based at
Georgetown University, takes a different view of the matter; he and
his colleagues see legal reform of public health emergency laws as an
essential component of national security planning. They argue that
many state public health laws are out of date, designed to respond to
old public health threats that are no longer among our chief con-
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15

cerns. They contend that older public health emergency laws do
not reflect either current understanding of medical science nor the
recognition of individual rights that has become enshrined in law and
16
bioethics in recent years. Gostin and his colleagues also argue that
the variation among public health laws from state to state could im17
pede a response to a multistate public health emergency. Finally,
Gostin and his colleagues contend that many state statutory frameworks that govern public health emergencies are confusing and could
18
lead to delay in the event of an attack of bioterrorism. They view
the MSEHPA as a solution to these problems.
State laws adopted in recent years to respond to bioterrorist
threats will have a huge impact on the lives of ordinary citizens in the
event of an attack. The bioterrorism bill passed in 2002 by the federal government—the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Pre19
paredness and Response Act —relies a great deal on the response of
states because much of the authority to respond to public health
emergencies lies within the purview of state police power. The federal government also has considerable public health emergency
20
power, however, as I will discuss below. As a result, the variations in
state public health emergency legislation could mean that citizens’
constitutional rights could be vitiated in State A, where the legislature
has enacted one statutory framework, and could remain much more
protected in State B, where the statutory framework balances the tension between preservation of public health and civil liberties differently.
III. QUARANTINE
One of the key responses to public health emergencies envisioned
by laypeople is quarantine. Quarantine has been discussed extensively in popular discourse; leper colonies make an appearance in at
21
least one classic film about the ancient world, and anyone who has
15
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Lawrence O. Gostin et al., The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: Planning for and
Response to Bioterrorism and Naturally Occurring Infectious Diseases, 288 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 622,
623 (2002).
Id. at 623–24.
Id. at 624.
Id.
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594.
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., BEN-HUR (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1959) (providing an example of the cinematic
treatment of an ancient leper colony).

1056

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 11:4

ever visited the museum at Ellis Island knows that people coming into
the United States were often quarantined to ensure that they were
not carrying infectious diseases before they were allowed to enter the
22
country. More recently, the use of quarantine and isolation as public health tools made the national news when Andrew Speaker—the
so-called “traveling tuberculosis patient”—was isolated at the National
Jewish Medical and Research Center in Denver for eight weeks while
23
he received treatment.
Quarantine has been used to control disease for centuries. Ailing
24
individuals are isolated from their communities in the Bible, and
individuals infected (or possibly infected) with the bubonic plague
25
were isolated in Europe during the Middle Ages. Quarantine is distinct from isolation; quarantine is the separation of well persons presumed to be exposed to an infectious agent from the general population, whereas isolation is the separation of persons already ill with an
26
infectious disease from those around them.
Quarantine powers
were established in the United States as early as 1796, when, in response to a yellow fever epidemic, Congress passed a statute that allowed the federal government to assist states in establishing quaran27
tine. Massachusetts passed the nation’s first comprehensive public
health powers statute shortly thereafter, in 1797, and that statute es28
tablished the first state quarantine powers in the new nation.
Quarantine was implemented at various times during the first one
hundred and thirty years of American history. A substantial facility
for detaining yellow fever victims was constructed outside of Phila-

22
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See National Library of Medicine, Images from the History of the Public Health Service:
Disease Control and Prevention, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/exhibition/phs_history/
21.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2009) (discussing the history of disease control and prevention in the immigration context).
Speaker was diagnosed with tuberculosis in January 2007, and doctors asked him not to
travel after they discovered that his tuberculosis was resistant to a number of drugs often
used to treat the infection. See Denise Grady, Fed up, TB traveler hits back at his critics, INT’L
HERALD TRIB., June 11, 2007, at 7; Miranda Hitti, Andrew Speaker Released from Hospital,
WEBMD HEALTH NEWS, July 26, 2007, http://www.medicinenet.com/script/main/
art.asp?articlekey=82856.
See Leviticus 13:46 (stating that infected persons must live in isolation).
Michelle A. Daubert, Comment, Pandemic Fears and Contemporary Quarantine: Protecting
Liberty Through a Continuum of Due Process Rights, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1299, 1302 (2007).
Danitza Tomianovic, Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Div. of Global Migration
and Quarantine, Quarantine: February 2006 CDC COCA Conference Call, 4–5 (2006)
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/coca/ppt/quarantine_020706.ppt.
Daubert, supra note 25, at 1303–04.
Id.
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delphia in 1799 following a yellow fever epidemic.
Quarantines
were often established to protect the American population from diseases that could be brought in by ships arriving from foreign countries. In 1808, for example, the Boston Board of Health began requiring that ships from the Mediterranean, the Caribbean, and other
tropical ports be quarantined for three days or not dock until a full
twenty-five days had passed since they left the last port, whichever was
30
longer. Nonetheless, large-scale quarantine has not been imposed
31
in the United States since the Spanish influenza epidemic of 1918.
Under current law, both states and the federal government have
32
the power to impose quarantine. The federal government’s power
to establish quarantine rests in several statutes: Title 42 of the United
33
34
States Code, the Stafford Act, and the Public Health Security and
35
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002. Title 42 confers power on the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Surgeon General, and the CDC to limit movement of individuals (both
36
into and within the United States) to prevent the spread of disease.
Quarantine is authorized to prevent the spread of a limited number
of communicable diseases; those diseases must be identified by Ex37
ecutive Order. The most recent such Executive Order, issued by
President Bush in April 2003 and amended in 2005, contains an extensive list of “quarantinable” communicable diseases, including
cholera, diphtheria, infectious tuberculosis, plague, smallpox, yellow
38
fever, viral hemorrhagic fevers, SARS, and a variety of influenzas.
29
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Id.
Joseph Barbera et al., Large-Scale Quarantine Following Biological Terrorism in the United
States: Scientific Examination, Logistic and Legal Limits, and Possible Consequences, 286 J. AM.
MED. ASS’N 2711, 2712 n.13 (2001).
Daubert, supra note 25, at 1304–08.
42 U.S.C. §§ 264, 266 (2000).
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5206
(2000) (repealed in part by the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 § 323, Pub. L. No. 106-390,
114 Stat. 1552); see; JASON W. SAPSIN, CTR. FOR LAW AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH AT
GEORGETOWN AND JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVS., OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL AND STATE QUARANTINE
AUTHORITY 4 (2002), http://www.publichealthlaw.net/Resources/ResourcesPDFs/
4quarantine.pdf; Daubert, supra note 25, at 1308.
Pub. L. No. 107–188, 116 Stat. 594.
42 U.S.C. § 264 (2000).
SAPSIN, supra note 34, at 2.
Exec. Order No. 13,295, 68 Fed. Reg. 17,255 (Apr. 4, 2003); Exec. Order No. 13, 375, 70
Fed. Reg. 17,299 (Apr. 1, 2005); Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Questions and
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The Stafford Act provides a second avenue through which the
39
federal government can establish quarantine. Following a declaration of emergency, the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(“FEMA”) and a number of other agencies (including the Centers for
Disease Control) are authorized to implement health and safety
measures, which the Center for Law and the Public’s Health has in40
terpreted as including quarantine. The Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 authorizes the
Department of Health and Human Services to provide assistance to
states in the event of a bioterrorist attack, which arguably extends to
41
assisting states in the establishment of quarantine.
State police power was extended to imposition of quarantine in
42
Gibbons v. Ogden. The degree to which states articulate their power
43
to impose quarantine, however, varies greatly. For the most part,
state laws dealing with quarantine power discuss three major categories of concerns: sexually transmitted diseases; “traditional” illnesses,
such as smallpox; and “re-emerging” infections, such as tuberculosis,
which, after a number of years of dormancy, appear to be re44
surfacing. In addition, a number of states have amended their old
statutory frameworks or passed new laws to respond to specific con45
cerns that arose after 9/11.
Quarantine, while arguably a useful public health tool, poses a
threat to civil liberties, including the right to due process. The Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution state that persons
cannot be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
46
law. Due process jurisprudence has developed into two categories:
substantive and procedural. Substantive due process jurisprudence is
a vast area of constitutional law that has encompassed everything
from the right of women to use contraception to the right of parents

39
40
41
42
43
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List of Quarantinable Diseases, (2006) http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dq/qa_influenza_
amendment_to_eo_13295.htm#diseasesadded (noting that SARS was added to the list in
2003 and the other diseases have been on the list since 1983); Tomianovic, supra note 26.
42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5208 (2000).
SAPSIN, supra note 34, at 4.
Id.
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203 (1824); Daubert, supra note 25, at 1304.
SAPSIN, supra note 34, at 5.
Id.; see also Paula Mindes, A Tuberculosis Quarantine: A Review of Legal Issues in Ohio and
Other States, 10 J.L. & HEALTH 403, 405–06 (1995) (discussing the re-emergence of tuberculosis since the 1980s).
SAPSIN, supra note 34, at 5.
U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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to direct the education of their children. This Part of the paper examines only the procedural due process implications of the various
state bioterrorism response plans. Certain aspects of substantive due
process implicated by bioterrorism response are discussed in the portion of the paper that analyzes the threats to civil liberties associated
with mass vaccination.
Quarantine requires collective action; quarantine is most effective
when ninety percent of the affected population is compliant with the
48
quarantine order. So any effective quarantine would have to apply
to almost all individuals, including those opposed to it. One of
George Annas’s objections to the MSEHPA is its contemplation of
49
quarantine, despite the fact that mass quarantine has not been implemented for the better part of a hundred years (as noted above).
One obvious interest implicated by the prospect of quarantine is the
liberty interest; because quarantine would limit the right of individuals to move around, the most basic understanding of liberty would be
compromised by quarantine. As held in Foucha v. Louisiana,
“[f]reedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary govern50
mental action.”
In O’Connor v. Donaldson, Chief Justice Burger
stated that involuntary commitment of any kind constitutes “a deprivation of liberty which the State cannot accomplish without due
51
process of law.” Quarantine and isolation implicate “the most elemental of liberty interests—the interest in being free from physical
52
detention by one’s own government.” Nonetheless, freedom from
bodily restraint is not absolute; even outside the criminal context, examples of such governmental restraint exist, particularly in the con53
text of mental illness treatment. Arguably, quarantine serves a similar function. The deprivation of liberty has the potential to benefit
the individual (by increasing the chances that she will get appropriate
treatment) as well as the population as a whole (by detaining people

47
48
49
50
51
52
53

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
400–03 (1923).
Mark A. Rothstein & Meghan K. Talbott, Encouraging Compliance with Quarantine: A Proposal to Provide Job Security and Income Replacement, 97 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S49 (2007).
Annas, supra note 10, at 33.
504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992).
422 U.S. 563, 580 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004).
See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 605–06 (1979) (holding that children can be committed to mental institutions by their parents or guardians without an adversarial hearing).
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who may be dangerous to others), thus mirroring the dual purposes
of mental illness treatment.
Procedural due process rights reflect the context in which they
are applied. The Supreme Court has held that the interests of the
individual must be balanced with the interests of the state, while
54
keeping in mind what benefits might arise from additional process.
Within the mental health context, for example, the Supreme Court
limited the rights of minors to procedural due process in part because states do not have the resources to second-guess (via an adversarial hearing) every medical decision made by parents on behalf of
55
their children. The Supreme Court cited a number of reasons for
holding that an adversarial hearing was unnecessary to protect the
rights of children being committed to mental institutions despite
56
their objections. Likewise, courts have held that states need not be
held to the due process standards of less urgent proceedings, such as
57
criminal trials, when establishing quarantine.
The Fourteenth Amendment requires that states afford individuals specific due process protections before depriving them of life, liberty, or property. Basic procedural requirements often include notice, a hearing, access to counsel, and a final decision that is
58
accompanied by an opportunity to seek review of that decision.
Confinement for medical reasons has been deemed an infringement
on liberty interests in other contexts. In 1979, the Supreme Court
held that civil commitment for psychiatric purposes constitutes a deprivation of liberty and cannot be imposed without sufficient proc59
ess. The Supreme Court has limited the right of the state to commit
mentally ill persons who were not a threat to themselves or those
60
around them to psychiatric facilities. The Court has also held that
the loss of liberty through one set of constitutionally sufficient proce61
dures is insufficient to justify the loss of liberty in another context.
Courts have held that quarantines are subject to many of the same

54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976).
Parham, 442 U.S. at 605–06.
Id. at 605–08.
See, e.g., Morales v. Turman, 562 F.2d 993, 998 (5th Cir. 1977) (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29–30 (1905)).
Daubert, supra note 25, at 1316–17; see, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432–33 (1979); see Mindes, supra note 44, at 413–15.
See O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975).
See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491–92 (1980) (holding that a prison could not transfer
an inmate to a mental hospital without a hearing despite the fact that he had already
been adjudicated in the criminal justice system).
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due process requirements as civil commitments for mental illness,
and many state laws, including those discussed below, reflect that development. Because quarantine serves a similar purpose as civil
commitment for mental illness treatment, similar procedures may be
required in the event of a modern quarantine, and updated public
health laws, such as those of Minnesota and Delaware, provide for a
number of due process protections in the event of quarantine (discussed below).
Mathews v. Eldridge, as noted above, established that courts should
employ a balancing test to determine what kind of process is due, taking into consideration the benefit of additional process to the indi63
vidual and the cost to the state of requiring additional procedures.
The establishment of the Mathews test suggests that statutes that balance the benefits of preserving civil liberties and the burdens of providing additional process are more likely to withstand judicial scrutiny. Therefore, the value of state bioterrorism response plans should
be measured by the degree to which the plans stress the preservation
of individual liberty as a goal separate from that of protecting the populace from the danger of a biological agent. The following Part examines the three state plans with that question in mind and concludes that however flawed modern bioterrorism response laws may
be, they provide concrete protections for constitutional rights that
some old public health emergency laws lack.
A. Minnesota
Minnesota statutory law requires that any quarantine be instituted
64
by the “least restrictive means necessary.” It contains substantial requirements to protect the due process rights of quarantined and isolated individuals. (For the sake of clarity, the due process protection
provisions for all of the plans are summarized at the end of the statespecific discussion.) The Minnesota legislature appears to have contemplated what shape a quarantine might take and attempted to provide for the kind of quarantine that would be least frightening to the
Minnesota citizenry; the statute anticipates establishing quarantine of
individuals in their own homes (though it does not limit the power of

62
63
64

See Mindes, supra note 44, at 417 (noting that courts sometimes apply the procedural due
process protections required for civil commitment in quarantine cases).
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976).
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.419, subdiv. 2(b) (West 2005 & Supp. 2009).
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65

the state to quarantine in other locations). Another component of
the Minnesota quarantine powers statute that must be the result of
careful assessment of the risks of quarantine is the requirement that
quarantined and isolated individuals be given a “reliable means” to
communicate with health officials (presumably these would often be
the same officials responsible for placing them in quarantine in the
66
first place) twenty-four hours a day. The express purpose of this
provision is to ensure that health emergencies do not go unattended.
It also helps to ensure, however, that the requirements of another
provision, stating that individuals be immediately released if they do
67
not pose a known risk to the others, will be adequately met. Functionally speaking, this means that at any time of day a quarantined
individual who suspects she is no longer contagious can seek out a
health official and ask her to confirm the legitimacy of her continued
quarantine.
In addition to the requirement that quarantined and isolated individuals be able to communicate with health professionals, there is a
statutory requirement that family members of persons who are isolated or quarantined be able to enter the area to which individuals
68
are restricted. This requirement lessens the possibility that large
numbers of the population would end up quarantined for an indefinite amount of time without access to friends and family who could
advocate for their speedy release. Finally, Minnesota law requires
that isolation or quarantine must automatically terminate when the
court order that instituted it expires or at the point at which health
officials deem the persons involved no longer a risk to others, which69
ever occurs first.
B. Delaware
Delaware’s quarantine powers track those of Minnesota to a certain degree. It lays out similar requirements to protect the due process rights of quarantined individuals. Delaware too requires that the
state must use the “least restrictive means necessary” to prevent the
70
spread of disease in the event of a public health emergency. But in

65
66
67
68
69
70

Id. § 144.419, subdiv. 2(b).
Id. § 144.419, subdiv. 2(d).
Id. § 144.419, subdiv. 2(f).
Id. § 144.419, subdiv. 5(b).
Id. § 144.419, subdiv. 3.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 3136(1)(c) (2005).
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comparing the Delaware and Minnesota emergency health powers,
the devil is in the details.
The Delaware plan does not require, for example, that quarantined and isolated individuals have access to health officials twentyfour hours a day, which heightens the risk that individuals will be quarantined or isolated and then ignored, particularly since it is coupled with the fact that the Delaware quarantine powers do not require immediate release of a person who poses no risk to the public
and do not require that the risk be “known,” as the Minnesota plan
requires. Delaware law requires that a quarantine be terminated
when the person no longer poses an ongoing risk, but it leaves more
power in the hands of the health official, which, as noted above, the
71
individual seeking to be released may or may not be able to contact.
It does not require that family members be able to enter the quarantine/isolation area, thereby excluding those most likely to serve as
advocates for those who have been detained, and also may pose additional constitutional concerns beyond the range of the present discussion. For example, the constitutional requirement that parents
should be able to oversee the care of their children might be placed
72
in jeopardy under such circumstances.
On the other hand, the Delaware quarantine powers contain certain aspects that Minnesotans might want to add to their statutory
provisions for quarantine and isolation, the most significant of which
is the standard of proof needed to institute quarantine. Delaware law
requires “clear and convincing evidence” that individuals pose a risk
73
to others before quarantine or isolation can be imposed. In addition, the Delaware plan requires that a person must pose “a significant risk of transmitting a disease to others with serious conse74
quences” in order to justify quarantine. While one might argue that
no state would go through the trouble of instituting a quarantine
without the prospect of “serious consequences,” one of the objections
to the MSEHPA was that it was too broad and contemplated govern75
ment action in terms that were overly expansive. Given that due
process is a continual balancing act, as evidenced by the test laid out

71
72

73
74
75

Id. § 3136(2)(b).
In 1923, the Supreme Court held that there were limits to the degree the state could interfere with a parent’s right to control the education of his children. Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 3136(2)(a).
Id. § 3136(2)(a).
Id.; Annas, supra note 2, at 51–52.
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in Mathews, the addition of clear standards and a reminder of the circumstances in which quarantine and isolation can be legitimately imposed provides additional protection for the constitutional rights of
76
the citizenry.
C. Mississippi
Mississippi provides yet another perspective on post-9/11 health
emergency response. While Mississippi law provides for the establishment of quarantine, the statutes that do so are quite old—one of
77
them was passed in 1950. The quarantine laws in Mississippi do not
designate what kind of court proceedings are required to establish
quarantine; they do not indicate a system for appeal once quarantine
is established. They do not state what kind of evidence is required to
quarantine an individual or under what circumstances the quarantine
will come to an end. They do not establish who can visit people in
quarantine or who will treat them, and they lack the requirement,
present in both the Delaware and Minnesota statutes, that the space
in which individuals are quarantined be managed appropriately so as
78
to maintain a hygienic environment. In sum, Mississippi quarantine
laws lack the requirements (as explained below) that both Delaware
and Minnesota included to protect the due process rights of individuals quarantined or isolated by the state.
Mississippi law also provides for specific power to quarantine indi79
viduals with sexually transmitted infections (“STIs”), which makes
little scientific sense. A recent CDC report suggests that quarantine is
usually imposed to prevent the spread of diseases that are passed easily from person to person, often through airborne transmission, such
as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (“SARS”), as opposed to STIs
like AIDS, which is not on the “quarantinable” diseases list found in
80
the most recent Executive Order on the matter. The timing of the
passage of the law is telling; it was made effective in 1983, in the early
76
77
78
79
80

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976).
MISS. CODE ANN. § 21-19-3 (2007); id. § 41-23-5.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 3136(3)(a); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.419, subdiv. 2(h) (West
2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-23-5.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-23-27.
Exec. Order No. 13,295, 68 Fed. Reg. 17,255 (Apr. 4, 2003); Ctrs. for Disease Control and
Prevention, Public Health Guidance for Community-Level Preparedness and Response to Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) Version 2, Supplement: Community Containment Measures,
Including Non-Hospital Isolation and Quarantine, Frequently Asked Questions About Use of Community Containment Measures, (2004) http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/guidance/d/
word/app2. doc (2004).
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years of the AIDS crisis. We now know that quarantine is unnecessary
to prevent the spread of STIs, and this law is an example of the kind
of antiquated law that does not respond to current concerns de81
scribed by Lawrence Gostin and his colleagues.
Indeed, in the
course of a search for recent small-scale quarantines in Delaware,
Minnesota, and Mississippi, I discovered only two such examples:
both in Mississippi, and both involving men with HIV, one who was
82
gay and one who was a male prostitute. One would hope that in the
course of a modernization of public health emergency legislation,
Mississippi would eliminate laws that unnecessarily stigmatize those
affected by sexually transmitted diseases.
D. Due Process Requirements
The Minnesota and Delaware quarantine powers statutes have
similar procedural requirements. Both require a court order to initi83
ate non-emergency quarantine or isolation. Both provide for temporary quarantine without a court order and require that the public
health authority request an order after initiating the quarantine or
84
isolation. Both require that quarantined or isolated individuals have
access to counsel in the event of a hearing and require that people
who cannot afford counsel be provided with representation at state
85
expense.
In many cases Minnesota law is more protective than Delaware
law. Minnesota, for example, requires notice of quarantine or isolation; Delaware provides an out, allowing officials to provide reasons
86
that notice is impractical. One substantial difference is that Minnesota allows the state to detain individuals without a hearing for up to
twenty-one days; Delaware does not place an outside limit on how
long the state can detain an individual under quarantine, though the
statute does require that a hearing be held within seventy-two hours if
87
one is requested by the detained individual. Delaware, however (as
81
82

83
84
85
86
87

Gostin et. al., supra note 15, at 623.
See Carter v. State, 803 So. 2d 1191 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999); Male Prostitute in Mississippi Put
Under Quarantine Order, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1987, at B17. In Carter v. State, the defendant
was sentenced to five years in prison for violating a quarantine order that required him to
inform his sexual partners of his HIV status and “refrain from any activity whereby his
blood would be commingled with others’ blood.” 803 So. 2d at 1193.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 3136(5)(c); MINN. STAT. § 144.4195, subdiv. 1(a).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 3136(5)(d); MINN. STAT. § 144.4195, subdiv. 2(a).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 3136(7)(b); MINN. STAT. § 144.4195, subdiv. (2)(a).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 3136(5)(b)(7); MINN. STAT. § 144.4195, subdiv. 1(c).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 3136(5)(e); MINN. STAT. § 144.4195, subdiv. 1(e).
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noted above), requires a standard of clear and convincing evidence
to initiate quarantine; under Minnesota law, ex parte orders for quarantine can be granted if “probable cause exists to believe isolation or
88
quarantine is warranted to protect the public health.” As noted
above, the Mississippi laws governing quarantine lack all of these procedural protections, demonstrating that the most important distinction is not between the different modern statutes but between the
modern statutes and the old statutes; the newer statutes provide
much more comprehensive protection of civil liberties.
IV. VACCINATION
In the event of an attack of bioterrorism, one of the primary public health tools that might be implemented to prevent the spread of
an infectious agent is mass vaccination. For example, the spread of
89
smallpox, one of the oldest tools of bioterrorism, might be best prevented by vaccinating everyone in the affected area. The smallpox
vaccine has not been widely distributed in the United States since
1972 when the disease was eradicated from the United States, but the
CDC currently holds enough vaccine to immunize everyone in the
90
United States in the event of an emergency.
The MSEHPA contemplates mass vaccinations, and it contains a
provision that states should quarantine or isolate members of the
91
population who refuse to be vaccinated. Some health law scholarship has argued that any vaccination program responding to a major
health emergency should be mandatory, as the benefit to many out92
weighs the potential harm to a few. Indeed, Gostin argued in publications predating the MSEHPA that public health as a discipline re-

88
89

90
91
92

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 3136(2)(a); MINN. STAT. § 144.4195, subdiv. (1)(a).
During the French and Indian War (1754–63), the British gave blankets carrying the
smallpox virus to Native Americans allied with the French. Huge numbers of Native
Americans died from the disease as a result; they had never been exposed to the disease
and had no opportunity to build up immunity. Colette Flight, Silent Weapon: Smallpox
and Biological Warfare, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/coldwar/pox_weapon
_01.shtml (last visited Mar. 26, 2009).
Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Smallpox Fact Sheet: Vaccine Overview, http:
//www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/vaccination/facts.asp (last visited Mar. 26, 2009).
MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT, art. VI, § 603(a)(3) (2001).
Brendon Kohrs, Note, Bioterrorism Defense: Are State Mandated Compulsory Vaccination Programs an Infringement upon a Citizen’s Constitutional Rights?, 17 J.L. & HEALTH 241 (2002–
2003).
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quires collective action; individuals cannot provide for minimum
93
standards of health acting alone.
Immunizations, however, are controversial for a number of reasons. Some Americans object to vaccines on spiritual grounds; most
states allow parents to forego vaccinations for children for religious
94
reasons. In West Virginia, one of the two states that does not allow
such religious exemptions, an anti-mandatory vaccine group is currently advocating for exemptions, indicating that objection to vac95
cines in that state is a live issue. In addition, a health-related antivaccine movement has recently emerged. Of particular concern to
parents in recent years has been the speculated link between vaccines
containing thimerosal and the increasing prevalence of autism spectrum disorders, which by some estimates affect one in every 150
96
American children. Though the CDC and the Institute of Medicine
state that available evidence does not support the supposed link be97
98
tween vaccines and autism, many parents remain wary.
Recent
news coverage indicates that some parents seek religious exemptions
for their children’s vaccinations despite the fact that they do not belong to a religion that objects to immunizations because they are
99
concerned about the health ramifications. Finally, a firestorm of
controversy arose surrounding the introduction of the human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine, which is recommended for eleven to
twelve-year-old girls and can be given to girls as young as nine years
100
old.
Some social conservatives initially objected to vaccinating

93
94

95
96
97
98
99
100

LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 7 (2001).
See West Virginians for Vaccination Exemption, http://www.wvve.info (last visited Mar.
26, 2009) (urging legislation in West Virginia to provide the exemptions already available
in most states). In Mississippi, one of the few states that lacks a religious exemption for
immunizations, a law that allowed religious exemptions was held unconstitutional under
the Fourteenth Amendment. Brown v. Stone, 378 So. 2d. 218 (Miss. 1979), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 887 (1980). See also Donya Khalili & Arthur Caplan, Off the Grid: Vaccinations
Among Homeschooled Children, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 471, 473 & n.43 (2007).
West Virginians for Vaccination Exemption, Religious Reasons, http://www.wvve.info/
issues/religious.html (last visited March 26, 2009).
Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Mercury and Vaccines (Thimerosal), http://
www.cdc.gov/vaccinesafety/concerns/thimerosal.htm (last visited March 26, 2009).
Id.
Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Book Is Rallying Resistance to the Antivaccine Crusade, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
13, 2009, at D1.
Associated Press, Parents Claim Religion to Avoid Vaccines for Kids, MSNBC.COM, Oct. 17,
2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21347434/.
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, HPV VACCINE QUESTIONS & ANSWERS
(2006), http://www.cdc.gov/std/hpv/hpv-vaccine.pdf.
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young girls, arguing that eliminating the risk of HPV would encour101
age sexual activity among teenagers.
In the event of a major public health emergency, the efficacy of
vaccination as a tool to prevent the spread of disease will only be as
extensive as the vaccination program is comprehensive. Every person
who remains unvaccinated in such a situation arguably becomes a risk
to the people living around her, and so the question arises of how to
respond to an individual’s refusal to be vaccinated. Modern case law
indicates that the right to refuse medical treatment is enshrined in
102
constitutional law. The analysis of Minnesota, Delaware, and Mississippi statutes highlights the different ways that states balance the use
of vaccination as a public health tool with the preservation of individual civil liberties.
A. Privacy, Personal Autonomy, and Bodily Integrity
Unlike the right to due process, there is no express constitutional
provision providing for an individual’s right to privacy or personal
autonomy, and the existence of that right has been hotly debated.
This debate received substantial attention in 1987 when Robert
Bork’s refusal to recognize such a right may have led many to oppose
103
his nomination to the Supreme Court.
Nonetheless, case law regarding a number of aspects of American life has coalesced into what
we now understand as the right to bodily integrity and personal autonomy.
Modern case law regarding bodily integrity and personal autonomy provides a stark contrast with the key Supreme Court case on
mass vaccinations. In Jacobson v. Massachusetts the Court held that
104
mandatory vaccinations were constitutional.
Despite its considerable age (it was handed down in 1905), Jacobson is a crucial case in the
105
public health legal framework, and scholars still regularly cite it. In
Jacobson, the Court clearly stated that the liberty interest at stake is not
106
absolute. As Justice Harlan stated, “[t]here are manifold restraints

101
102
103
104
105

106

David Brown, HPV Vaccine Advised for Girls, WASH. POST, June 30, 2006, at A5.
Cruzan v. Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269–70 (1990).
Erwin Chemerinsky, Seeing the Emperor’s Clothes: Recognizing the Reality of Constitutional Decision Making, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1069, 1076 (2006).
197 U.S. 11 (1905).
See, e.g., Daniel D. Stier et al., The Courts, Public Health, and Legal Preparedness, 97 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH S69 (2007) (citing the Jacobson decision authorizing mandatory smallpox
vaccination).
Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26.
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to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good.”
Jacobson, however, was decided before the modern individual rights
doctrine was developed. While the Supreme Court has not had to
address the issue of mass vaccination recently and therefore has not
had to reconcile recent decisions with the precedent laid out in Jacobson, modern requirements for personal autonomy in a medical setting call that precedent into question.
Beginning in 1965, the Supreme Court handed down a series of
decisions that emphasized the importance of “zones of privacy” for
108
individuals.
The cases from the mid-1960s that led up to the various abortion decisions established a right to privacy that is now un109
derstood more as a right to bodily integrity and personal autonomy.
In 1965, the Court struck down a Connecticut law that banned the
110
use of contraception by married couples. Justice Douglas found the
right to privacy in penumbras emanating from the First, Third,
111
Fourth, and Fifth Amendments.
Justice Harlan argued that the
right to marital privacy was “implicit in the concept of ordered lib112
erty” provided for by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Justices Goldberg, Warren, and Brennan found the right to privacy in the Ninth
Amendment, which protects rights not specifically enumerated by the
113
other nine amendments of the Bill of Rights.
The Court emphasized that the doctrine of marital privacy was established long before
114
Griswold reaffirmed that the Court was disinthe Bill of Rights.
clined to allow the state to interfere with aspects of private individuals’ lives that traditionally had been free of state scrutiny.
In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court extended the holding of Griswold
115
to include the right of unmarried persons to use contraception. In
that opinion, Justice Brennan argued that the right of marital privacy
was dependent on the right of the individuals in that marriage to privacy: “If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the in107
108
109

110
111
112
113
114
115

Id.
See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 169 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
Seth F. Kreimer, Rejecting “Uncontrolled Authority Over the Body”: The Decencies of Civilized
Conduct, the Past and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 423, 438–39
(noting the discussion of “bodily integrity” in the Casey plurality).
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479.
Id. at 484.
Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937)).
Id. at 487 (Goldberg, J., concurring); see also U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (majority opinion).
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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dividual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
116
decision whether to bear or beget a child.” Though the holding in
Eisenstadt rests largely on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (holding that treating similarly situated persons
differently on the basis of marital status violates the Equal Protection
Clause), Eisenstadt also served to expand the privacy protection in
Griswold that rests on the doctrine of marital privacy into a broader
notion that there should be a sphere of life relatively free from gov117
ernment intervention.
Roe v. Wade was a logical extension of the right to privacy, since
the decision directly affected the right of women to control whether
118
The fundamental right of a
they were to “bear or beget a child.”
pregnant woman to seek an abortion as identified in Roe is based on
the liberty interest identified in the Due Process Clause. Roe proved a
divisive addition to the right to privacy doctrine, and contentious discussion of the right to privacy has often served as a proxy for an ongoing debate about the validity of Roe. Despite the controversy, Roe has
survived a number of changes to the Court, though it has been limited by subsequent cases, particularly Planned Parenthood of Southeast119
120
ern Pennsylvania v. Casey and Gonzales v. Carhart.
The plurality opinion in Casey focuses on a right to “bodily integrity”—a right that is never explicitly mentioned in Roe, but which the
121
The
Court in Casey stated was established when Roe was decided.
authoring Justices found that the principle of bodily integrity became
enshrined in constitutional law in part through a range of cases decided between Roe and Casey, one of which was Cruzan v. Director, Mis122
souri Department of Health (discussed further below).
As Professor
Seth Kreimer noted in a recent article, however, the notion of bodily
123
integrity arose in the medical context before Cruzan ; in Mills v. Rogers, the Court found that involuntary administration of antipsychotic

116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123

Id. at 453 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 454.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 169 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (citing Baird, 405 U.S. at
453).
505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992) (holding that states can require parental consent for abortions
for minors, provided there is a judicial bypass).
550 U.S. 124 (2007) (upholding a law that banned intact dilation and evacuation, a form
of late-term abortion also known as partial-birth abortion).
Casey, 505 U.S. at 849.
Id. at 857; Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
Kreimer, supra note 109, at 438–40.
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medication might violate the Due Process Clause, and that princi125
ple was confirmed in Washington v. Harper. Kreimer argues that the
right to bodily integrity has become more entrenched in recent years
as the Court has continued to hear the claims of plaintiffs seeking to
126
protect themselves from physical intrusion sanctioned by the state.
Though Kreimer focuses on cases arising from incarceration, those
cases have important implications for the rights of individuals in the
context of a public health emergency, when individuals are more
likely than usual to be under the physical control of government officials.
Particularly important within the context of public health is the
significance that medical decision-making holds within this doctrine.
Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe all involved laws that limited the right of
individuals to take advice offered by medical personnel or to undergo
procedures that physicians would have been otherwise willing to perform had the law not intervened. In each case, the Court limited the
right of the state to intervene in decisions made by individuals at the
recommendation or with the consent of their medical providers. In
Cruzan, a case involving a dispute about whether to terminate artificial hydration and nutrition being given to a woman in a persistent
vegetative state, the Court clarified and extended this arc of jurispru127
dence.
In that case, the Court noted the ancient principle, enshrined in tort law, that unwanted medical treatment constitutes a
128
battery.
Cruzan limited that right in certain circumstances, holding that
states can require “clear and convincing evidence” of an individual’s
wish to die if a patient’s representatives seek to terminate life129
sustaining treatment.
The Supreme Court has left much of the
regulation surrounding the “right to die” up to the states, as evi130
denced by both Cruzan and Gonzales v. Oregon, in which the Supreme Court struck down the Justice Department’s attempts to interfere with Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act. The Act provides for
physician-assisted suicide for terminally ill patients under highly regu-

124
125
126
127
128
129
130

Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982); Kreimer, supra note 109, at 437.
494 U.S. 210, 221–22 (1990) (holding that the patient had a “liberty interest in avoiding
the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs”).
Kreimer, supra note 109, at 439–40.
497 U.S. 261.
Id. at 269–70.
Id. at 280.
546 U.S. 243 (2006).
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131

lated and monitored circumstances. As a result, there is a space in
which state regulation of end-of-life treatment remains effectively unregulated by constitutional jurisprudence. According to Cruzan,
132
states may limit the right to refuse life-saving medical treatment, but
states may also provide for the right to physician-assisted suicide if the
133
legislature chooses to do so. The right-to-die cases have important
implications for individual rights in a public health emergency. Cruzan stands for the understanding that individuals have a basic right to
direct their medical care but also allows for the right of states to limit
134
that right when important government interests are implicated.
The arc of cases including Roe, Casey, and Cruzan has created new expectations regarding individual privacy that have wide-ranging implications for the development of bioethics policy. The precedent set by
Jacobson, if challenged in the current context, will have to be reconciled with the more modern understanding that individuals have a
right to refuse medical care and to prevent government intrusion
upon their persons.
B. Minnesota
The Minnesota and Delaware statutes differ markedly as to how
they treat vaccination in the event of a public health emergency.
Minnesota law states that individuals under isolation or quarantine
have “a fundamental right to refuse medical treatment, testing, physi135
cal or mental examination, [and] vaccination.” The statute goes on
to state that if a quarantined person refuses to be vaccinated or otherwise treated as indicated above, the person may have to remain in
quarantine, but the statute is clearly designed to remind health officials and governing authorities that individuals do not lose their right
136
to medical privacy in the context of isolation and quarantine. Furthermore, because “the right to refuse all interventions continues in
137
isolation and quarantine,” the threat of quarantine is less coercive.

131
132
133
134
135
136
137

Oregon Department of Human Services—Public Health Division, FAQs about the Death
with Dignity Act, http://oregon.gov/DHS/ph/pas/faqs.shtml (last visited Mar. 26, 2009).
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280 (holding that a state can require “clear and convincing evidence”
of the wishes of an incompetent patient to refuse life-saving treatment).
Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 269–70.
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.419, subdiv. 4 (West 2005 & Supp. 2009).
Id.
Annas, supra note 2, at 96.
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The point is confirmed in the statutory provision that governs
general emergency powers:
the provision states that
“[n]otwithstanding laws, rules, or orders made or promulgated in response to a national security emergency, individuals have a funda138
mental right to refuse medical treatment . . . .”
Furthermore, the
provision requires that any health official administering treatment
must inform the individual of her right to refuse treatment while noting the consequences, including the possibility of isolation and quar139
antine. Given that constitutional rights have little power if people
do not invoke them, this requirement may be the most important aspect of Minnesota’s statutory provisions governing vaccination in
times of emergency.
C. Delaware
Delaware takes a less protective approach. It, too, addresses the
issue of vaccination in its quarantine provisions, but the Delaware quarantine statute views vaccination differently. A refusal to accept
emergency vaccination under Delaware law constitutes “prima facie
140
evidence that said person should be quarantined or isolated”; in
short, a refusal to be vaccinated creates a presumption in favor of quarantine or isolation that then shifts the burden to rebut to the individual—a presumption that might be difficult to overcome in the
context of an emergency situation.
In addition, the Delaware provision does not state that vaccination
should be administered only to those individuals who consent, an
important component of the Minnesota law. Delaware law does not
make clear whether individuals maintain their right to refuse medical
treatment even in emergency situations, while Minnesota law is explicit on this point; notwithstanding a public health emergency, indi141
viduals have the right to refuse medical intervention.
As a result,
Delaware’s law also has no provision requiring health officials to inform individuals of their right to refuse medical treatment. So even
if—and the law is vague on this point—affected individuals do have
the right to refuse medical treatment in an emergency situation governed by these statutes, many of them will not know about it. The
necessity of informed consent is one of the central principles of

138
139
140
141

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 12.39, subdiv. 1.
Id. subdiv. 2.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 3136(2)(a) (2005).
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 12.39, subdiv. 1.

1074

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 11:4

modern bioethics, and medical professionals overseeing the response
to a public health emergency should be required by law to inform individuals of their rights.
D. Mississippi
Mississippi’s statute governing the spread of contagious disease is
vague on vaccinations. The provision that presumably would govern
most emergency health powers in Mississippi does not mention vaccination at all; it simply states that “governing authorities of municipalities shall have the power to make regulations to prevent the in142
troduction and spread of contagious or infectious diseases.”
Another provision, actually designed to address the question of immunizations for schoolchildren, contains the following: “[T]he state
health officer shall specify such immunization practices as may be
143
considered best for the control of vaccine preventable diseases.”
Those two statements contain essentially all the emergency vaccination power authorized in the state of Mississippi, and, in large part
because of their vagueness, the police power found within is largely
unlimited. They contain no acknowledgement of the fundamental
right to refuse medical treatment (perhaps not surprisingly, since
both the statutes predate Cruzan); the provisions fail to notify both
the public and health officials of the rights of individuals that should
be preserved in the event of a public health emergency. The provisions do not indicate what kind of emergency warrants mass vaccination. They do not indicate what the consequences of refusal entail.
In short, Mississippi law threatens the right of individuals to refuse
medical treatment because they do not contain guidelines for public
health emergencies. Mississippi law indicates that modernization of
public health emergency laws can clarify the rights of individuals in a
public health crisis. States should update their public health emergency laws, and they should take the approach that is the most protective of individual rights and, by extension, the approach that is
most likely to withstand judicial scrutiny.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, old laws may not be enough, and new laws need to
be drafted with care. Delaware’s law is by no means perfect; the atti-

142
143

MISS. CODE ANN. § 21-19-3 (2007).
Id. § 41-23-37.
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tude taken towards mass vaccination under Delaware law appears to
disregard the fundamental right of individuals to refuse unwanted
medical treatment. In addition, the fact that Minnesota takes a different—and more protective approach—indicates that reasonable
minds could conclude that efforts to preserve that right can co-exist
with comprehensive efforts to protect the public in the event of a
health emergency. Minnesota’s emergency health powers plan requires that health officials be mindful of the medical privacy rights of
individuals in the midst of potential chaos, and it requires that individuals themselves be continually reminded of those rights. A few
small changes to the Delaware plan would provide for additional protections of civil liberties in the event of an attack of bioterrorism. Either plan, however, provides more extensive protection than Mississippi’s outdated laws, which provide vague and extensive power to
vaccinate the public that is largely unlimited by recent developments
in our understanding of constitutional rights.
Quarantine is trickier. Because quarantine and isolation involve a
basic liberty interest—the right to go where we please when we please
and not to be confined to one location by the state—any quarantine
policy can seem draconian. Annas’s concern that the contemplation
of mass quarantine is more likely to elicit panic than protect public
health is a valid one. Delaware, and other states that have enacted
much of the MSEHPA, would do well to consider amending certain
provisions—putting an outside limit on the amount of time an individual can be detained for public health reasons without a hearing,
for example. But Minnesota’s law, which Annas noted as an example
of a more enlightened bioterrorism response plan, has provisions
similar to those found in the corresponding Delaware statute, and
both statutes track the MSEHPA to a considerable degree. It is difficult to envision a quarantine plan that does not limit individual liberties to a significant degree. Some states may choose not to have such
a plan for that reason; they may decide that to envision quarantine is
to promote the use of it, and as a result they may wish to avoid the
144
topic altogether.
The fact remains, however, that quarantine is an ancient public
health tool, and many states may reach the conclusion that in order
to prepare for an attack of bioterrorism, responsible quarantine pro-

144

Along similar lines, Annas has argued that “planning for mass vaccination . . . [is] more
likely to foster public panic and distrust than to be effective in a real emergency.” Annas,
supra note 10, at 46.
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cedures need to be on the books. Current scholarship suggests that
many public health professionals consider the possibility of quaran145
If quarantine is
tine a live question in our current circumstances.
implemented, a response plan drafted in advance that established the
rights of citizens under quarantine might better preserve civil liberties than an ad hoc response created in the charged political climate
that developed following an attack of bioterrorism. If states want to
provide public health officials with quarantine authority, either the
Minnesota or Delaware plan would provide greater protection for individual liberty than Mississippi’s current statutory framework. Both
plans have extensive requirements designed specifically to protect civil liberties, while Mississippi’s law lacks any such provisions. My analysis of the Mississippi laws indicates that they leave the citizenry of Mississippi open to chaos in the event of a bioterrorist attack and provide
no guidelines about how to preserve civil liberties in the event of an
emergency. Carefully drafted modernized response plans provide
one option for states seeking simultaneously to prepare for a bioterrorist attack and to preserve the civil rights of their citizens.
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See Cécile M. Bensimon & Ross E.G. Upshur, Evidence and Effectiveness in Decisionmaking for
Quarantine, 97 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S44, S44 (noting the renewed discussion of quarantine
among policymakers, ethicists, and medical professionals); Rothstein, supra note 48, at
S49 (noting the value of quarantine as a public health tool despite its restrictive nature).

